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In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued a report on the
patent system that was as surprising as it was sobering.' Rare is it to
find a federal agency that publicly critiques-and criticizes-the
performance of another federal agency in the area of its own specialty,
not to mention the decisions of an Article III, federal appellate court.
The FTC report, titled "To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy," did just that-with
remarkable acuity.
In its 315-page report, the FTC raised serious questions about the
patent system as overseen by the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), which reviews all patent applications, and by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"), which has
near 2 exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases. While
concluding that "[t]he patent system does, for the most part, achieve a
proper balance with competition policy,"3 the FTC identified-based
on criticisms by industry groups-specific deficiencies suggesting that
the patent system was saddled with questionable patents on
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1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo3/1o/innovationrpt.pdf [herein after FTC Report].
2 The one exception is a case in which the complaint did not allege a patent claim, but the
answer contained a patent-law counterclaim. In such cases, the Federal Circuit does not
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002).
3 FTC Report, supra note 1, at 4.
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undeserving inventions, as well as with doctrines and procedures that
"may have anticompetitive effects."4
The FTC report, although diplomatic in its criticisms of the PTO
and CAFC, intimated that neither institution was necessarily in step
with the need to foster innovation in our information economy. The
FTC report proposed specific reforms to the patent system, including a
post-grant opposition procedure for third parties to challenge the
validity of a patent.5 The report even suggested an overruling of the
Federal Circuit's "teaching, suggestion, motivation-to-combine" test
for nonobviousness. The test had been applied so restrictively by the
Federal Circuit that it left the Patent Office with very little room to
deny any patent on obviousness grounds unless the PTO could
somehow "point to particular items of prior art that concretely suggest
how to combine all of the features of a claimed invention."6 The FrC
report also recognized criticisms of the Federal Circuit's expansive
approach in allowing business method and software patents and
suggested that patentable subject matter under the Patent Code
should be interpreted in light of the Patent Clause's intent to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."7
If patent reform needed a tipping point, the FTC report surely
provided it. The FTC report was a clarion call to the federal
government and to the public that our very own patent system may be
stifling innovation and competition. Because the report came from a
disinterested government agency, it was too hard to ignore. After the
report, both Congress and the United States Supreme Court suddenly
turned their attention to patent law reform. For the first time in over
a half century, Congress began entertaining bills to provide a major
overhaul to our patent system, including the adoption of a post-grant
opposition procedure (now common in Europe and recommended in
the FrC report) and, even more radical, abandoning the U.S. first-to-
invent system for inventorship and replacing it with a first-to-file
system, consistent with the rest of the world.8 Representative Howard
Berman, one of the sponsors of the House bill, specifically cited the
4Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 7.
6d. at 11-12.
7d. at 15.




FTC report in support of his conclusion that "the current patent
system is flawed."9 Even though patent reform has received much
momentum in Congress, in April 2008 a bill had yet to be passed.
Whether Congress will pass patent reform legislation remains
uncertain.
Patent reform, nevertheless, proceeded on another front, most
notably in the Supreme Court. In 2o06 and 2007, the Supreme Court
decided four major patent cases-reversing the Federal Circuit in every
single case, two of them unanimously.1° At least two of the cases were
effectively "reform" cases, which rejected the patent doctrines of the
Federal Circuit as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Circuit's "general rule" requiring a district court to issue a
permanent injunction in every case of patent infringement, absent
exceptional circumstances, was an erroneous departure from the long
history of equity practice in awarding injunctions.11 The trial court's
decision to grant a permanent injunction must be guided by the
traditional principles of equity, without any presumption or near-
automatic rule in favor of injunctions, the Supreme Court ruled.12
This more flexible approach gives district courts considerable freedom
to authorize the award of damages in patent infringement cases,
without ordering an injunction against the infringing technology itself.
Under this flexible approach, the district court on remand in eBay
(again) declined to order an injunction after weighing the principles of
equity.13 Since the eBay case, other courts have exercised greater
discretion in denying injunctions in patent cases as well.14
The Supreme Court applied a similar, flexible approach in the
other key reform case, KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. There, the
9151 Cong. Rec. El16o (June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Berman).
10 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2o06); KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007);
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
1 eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 393.
12 Id.
13 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590-91 (2007).
14 See, e.g., Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(discussing the denial of a permanent injunction, but remanding for an explanation of the
royalty rate); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Teva Pharms. U.S.A., Inc., No. o5-CV-1887, 2007
WL 2669338, at *15-16 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007).
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Court rejected the Federal Circuit's requirement of a specific teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art references, in order for
the Patent Office to make a finding that an invention was obvious.'5
Although the Court did not cite the FTC's recommendation, the Court
agreed with the FTC's criticism of the Federal Circuit. In the Court's
view, the Federal Circuit's approach was too "rigid" and inconsistent
with prior Supreme Court case law, particularly the Court's decision in
Graham v. John Deere.16 Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice
Kennedy explained:
The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of
published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.
The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology
counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. In many
fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious
techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case
that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will
drive design trends. Granting patent protection to advances
that would occur in the ordinary course without real
innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents
combining previously known elements, deprive prior
inventions of their value or utility.17
Thus, regardless of whether Congress enacts major reforms to the
Patent Code, patent reform is already upon us. The Supreme Court
has effectuated key reforms of substantive patent law. And perhaps
more importantly, the heightened public scrutiny of the patent system
over the past five years has signaled a cautionary message about the
need for improving the patent system.
Already it appears that the Federal Circuit has gotten the message.
Within a matter of only five months since KSR was decided, the
Federal Circuit found inventions in four different cases to be obvious
and thus not patentable.' Even more significantly, the Federal Circuit
15 KSR Intl, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
16 Id. at 1734-35, 1739-41 (discussing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
17 Id. at 1741.
i8 See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 5O1 F.3d 1254, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 138o (Fed. Cir. 2007); Leapfrog
Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1Vol. 4:3
2008]
began reexamining other areas of patent law not reviewed by the
Supreme Court, but for which the Federal Circuit has been roundly
criticized-most notably, its expansive approach in allowing business
method patents. 19
In In re Comiskey, the Federal Circuit scaled back its expansive
approach by holding that business methods are unpatentable subject
matter if they "depend entirely on the use of mental processes"
divorced from any apparatus, machine, or software.20 Often perceived
as a "patent friendly" forum,21 the Federal Circuit appears to be taking
a more exacting eye to devising patent doctrines that do not
inadvertently lend themselves to the granting of undeserved patents
that retard innovation. That concern was manifest in the Federal
Circuit's (uncharacteristic) exegesis of the constitutional limits on the
patent power in Comiskey, in a passage that is worth quoting at
length:
The very constitutional provision that authorized Congress
to create a patent system, Article I, § 8, also limited the
subject matter eligible for patent protection to the "useful
arts.'; According to the Supreme Court, this constitutional
limitation on patentability "was written against the backdrop
of the [English] practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute
of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting monopolies to
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before
been enjoyed by the public." In the 16th and 17th centuries,
the English Crown granted monopolies over entire types of
business to specific individuals, for example the grant by
James I to Darcy in 16oo of the exclusive right to
manufacture or sell playing cards or the exclusive right to the
printing business held by the London guild of booksellers
and printers. The purpose of such monopolies "was to enrich
the King ... as well as the grantee, at the expense of the
community." With this background in mind, the framers
consciously acted to bar Congress from granting letters
patent in particular types of business. The Constitution
19 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
201n re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
21 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1989).
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explicitly limited patentability to "the national purpose of
advancing the useful arts-the process today called
technological innovation."22
In re Comiskey may well be only a precursor to the Federal Circuit's
reform of its own case law. On February 15, 2o08, it agreed to hear en
banc the case of In re Bilski,23 to reconsider its prior (controversial)
decisions allowing business method patents in State Street Bank4 and
patents for software-related inventions involving mathematical
algorithms in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. 25 An
overruling of State Street Bank or AT&T would have a profound effect
on patent law.
The Federal Circuit's recent cases confirm that patent reform is
already afoot. But the work of patent reform is not finished.
Congress, the courts, and the Patent Office must stay vigilant to
ensure that the patent system remains responsive to the incredible
demands and challenges posed by the ever-changing technologies in
our digital age and global economy. No patent system in the world
can be perfect, but every patent system certainly can stand for
improvement.
Identifying which areas of our patent system need reform-and
which do not-is no easy task, however. "Reform" can encompass
institutional changes, such as increased training and funding for
patent examiners; substantive law changes, such as the switch to a
first-to-file system or the modification of the nonobviousness
standard; and procedural changes, such as the adoption of an
opposition procedure. The instruments of reform can come from
Congress, the courts, the Patent Office, and even, as we shall see, non-
governmental organizations.
In this Symposium on "The Future of Patent Reform," we
considered several key aspects of the patent reform debate, from
several different perspectives. The collection of essays shows the
complexity of issues that patent reformers face today. Patent reform
is not a purely legal issue; it also is an economic, business,
administrative, and institutional issue, requiring decisionmakers to
221n re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1374-75 (internal citations omitted).
23 2008 WL 417680, at "1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (Question 5).
24 149 F.3d at 1375-76.
25 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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think well beyond just the four corners of a patent doctrine or textual
provision.
In "Patent Reform: No Time Like the Present," Professor Adam
Jaffe, an economist, provides an excellent synopsis of the main
arguments why many, including Jaffe, believe patent reform is
necessary today. Jaffe argues that too many patents are being granted
for undeserving inventions. The ease of obtaining patents and the
overall growth in their number may dampen innovation by making it
riskier for developers to invent in areas where they would face a
possibility of later being sued for patent infringement. Jaffe concludes
with several specific reform proposals of his own.
Of course, it is open to debate what aspects of the patent system
need reform. Spencer Hosie, an attorney experienced in patent
litigation involving high technology companies, examines the
controversy surrounding the "patent troll," the term that signifies
non-practicing entities that mainly license their patented know-how
or exact such licenses through litigation, instead of utilizing know-how
themselves. In "Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A
Practitioner's Perspective," Hosie challenges the conventional
perception in the popular media that patent trolls are ruining the
patent system. Analyzing specific patent cases and the economics of
litigating a patent infringement suit, Hosie attempts to show how the
so-called patent trolls are engaged in legitimate activities that other
patent holders, such as IBM, Microsoft, and Texas Instruments,
themselves undertake. In Hosie's view, all of the popular criticisms of
patent trolls are nothing more than myths.
In the next essay, "Claims to Information Qua Information and a
Structural Theory of Section 101," Professor Kevin Collins examines
an important issue for our information economy: whether information
qua information can be considered patentable subject matter under
§ lO of the Patent Code. Adopting what he calls a structural reading
of § lO, based on the dual functions of a patent to claim rights for the
inventor and to disclose know-how to the public, Collins attempts to
outline a viable theory-with an administrable limiting principle-that
can explain why information itself should not be patentable at all.
Finally, in "Community Service: Adapting Peer Review to the
Patenting Process," Christopher Wong, the project manager for the
Peer-to-Patent project at New York Law School, explains an exciting
new reform effort in the Patent Office. The Peer-to-Patent project is
an initiative started by Professor Beth Noveck at New York Law
School that attempts to solicit community or peer involvement in
finding relevant prior art that may disqualify an invention under
review for a patent. In other words, ordinary members of the public
can help the Patent Office find relevant prior art and conduct a better,
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more informed review of a patent application. The Patent Office
agreed to launch the Peer-to-Patent examination for a select number
of applications in computer architecture, software, and information
security. Although the project is experimental, a number of
prominent businesses have already voiced their support for the
initiative.
The essays in this Symposium, although written on a range of
topics, all suggest at least one common point of contention: the future
of patent reform is now. Innovation, competition, and our nation's
economy will suffer if we fail to review the decisions, operation, and
institutional design of the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit on a
regular basis, particularly given the incredible advances in technology
witnessed in the past decade. It should not take an ad hoc report of
the Federal Trade Commission to signal the need for such ongoing
review as a critical part of our patent system. The essays in this
Symposium make a valuable contribution to that process of review.
But, ultimately, it is up to Congress and the Supreme Court to provide
the necessary oversight that our patent system demands.
